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THE PUBLIC DIMENSION OF CONTRACT:
CONTRACTUAL PLURALISM BEYOND
PRIVITY
BERTRAM LOMFELD* & DAN WIELSCH**
Pluralism is the very idea of modern society. At a fundamental level this
applies to the transformation of the concept of reason. Modernity rejects the
traditional notion of a substantial reason that is directed at understanding a pregiven order and a teleologically determined world. Instead, reason is now
thought of as procedural, as a capacity to create a meaningful world by using
specific methods, arguments, and theories. For better or worse, what counts as
reasonable is decided by each field of human endeavor according to its own
standards. Reason becomes plural.
The “fact of pluralism” is the starting point for a political philosophy that
observes deep disagreements in present society not only about the “good” but
1
also about the “right.” The breeding ground for this development—in which
reason has been differentiated into autonomous spheres of knowledge and
practice—is the liberal idea of extending the principle of religious tolerance to
other controversial questions about the meaning, value, and purpose of human
2
life. In this sense, liberalism is the historic catalyst for the pluralism that
characterizes modern society. The medium for institutionalizing the freedom to
endorse different instantiations of reason is the law. As it were, modernity
becomes aware of itself in and through the law: “The greatest problem for the
human race, to the solution of which Nature drives man, is the achievement of a
3
universal civic society which administers law among men.” The type of law
deemed best suited to achieve this goal was private law. Only a law whose
leading idea is the enactment and protection of individual autonomy seemed
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able to accomplish “the development of all the capacities which can be achieved
by mankind . . . in the society with the greatest freedom.”
In the course of unfolding the pluralism of modern society, the distinguished
position occupied by liberal thought and liberal doctrine gave way to a
spectrum of concurrent theories about the purpose and the structure of private
law. All of these alternatives struggle with the fact that liberal doctrine
organizes itself around the notion of the individual will without addressing the
relation between individual rights and the conditions under which they are
exercised. Paradoxically, other than liberalism itself, these theories also respond
to the liberal opening up of reason. To be sure, the reflexivity that these
theories add to the reasoning of private law is not necessarily plural in the sense
that they construe rights as being placed in the context of different social
domains and their respective values. Economic analysis of law, for instance,
substitutes the liberal commitment to freedom with another (more narrow)
exclusive orientation when it models the individual only in terms of a homo
economicus, the decisions of which are subject to the imperative of efficiency.
By contrast, deliberative and systems theoretical approaches start with the
assumption of a legal pluralism and explicitly focus on the relation of different
normative domains in a given case. However, none of the private law theories
can claim to judge among the competing accounts. Pluralism in private law
theory does not just indicate an acknowledged multiplicity of methods within
legal science. Rather it embodies a controversy over different concepts of law
that brings about different notions of the subject, the status, and the limits of
legal reflexivity along with different standards of judicial control. Pluralistic
theories are not exempt. They are parties to the controversy, too. There is no
room for a monopoly on pluralism in private law theory.
Social pluralism has two main institutional backings. The obvious and often
discussed one is democracy. Continuous possibility of change and the limited
power of temporary rulers enables a diverse spectrum of political positions. A
constitutional system of checks and balances and a human rights-inspired
protection of minorities provide a strong legal basis for ethical selfdetermination. Yet the real dynamics of social pluralism springs from another
legal source. Whereas “democracy” denotes the public background of social
pluralism, “contract” is its private counterpart. The transformation of modern
4
societies from status to contract represents the release of pluralism. Freedom of
contract allows individuals to pursue diverse social goals and private interests.
Democracy needs legal procedural backing, but remains a political concept.
Instead, contract is a genuine legal institution. Contract is the legal heart of
social pluralism.
Indeed, our society is deeply contractual. Working, housing, consuming, or
entertaining would be unthinkable without a tight web of contractual relations.
The institution of contract even colonizes other legal institutions like

4. HENRY S. MAINE, ANCIENT LAW 170 (15th ed. 1894) (1861).
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“property” and “persons” (legal entities). Property rights in apartments, cars, or
computers are replaced with more dynamic contractual relations such as
renting, leasing, or services. Also, intellectual property rights are profoundly
modified with the help of contract. The transformation in both areas of legal
5
assignment of rights could be summarized as a question of “access,” which is
opened and regulated by specific contracts. The same is true for legal entities.
The organizational patterns of economic enterprises are transformed from
monolithic mega-companies to affiliated groups. Management hierarchies are
6
replaced with contractual networks. Within transnational trade, contracts are
even the main tool for ordering conflict resolution. Contract is the main legal
institution for the future evolution of society.
Yet contract is in itself a plural institution. Diverse contract laws all over the
world set out different prerequisites, secondary obligations, and limits of
contractual commitments. However various the answers are, they circle around
the same question: When is an arrangement binding and legally enforceable?
How long and how far is a contractual commitment binding? In addition to that
legal pluralism, there is also a plurality of theories about the “basis of
7
contract.” But do these theories have any practical significance? What is the
use of a contract theory? All contract theories at least touch on the question
why contracts are binding. Why is it important to know why contracts are
binding? Because this “why” influences the legal answers about the “when” and
the “how long” of the commitment. Contract theories reflect conceptions of
contract. The different conceptions of contract guide not only the making of
new contract regulations but also every interpretation of a rule of contract
law—as well as the interpretation of the contract itself. Every contract theory
implies a theory of contract law. Thus, “contractual pluralism” has at least three
dimensions. The first denotes the simple fact that contracting parties pursue
plural interests. The second addresses the legal pluralism of contract laws. And
the third the pluralistic cluster of contract theories.
Given this pluralism of contract, there are perhaps as many definitions of
contract and contract law as there are theories. Yet there is at least one
common effect of pluralism. Pluralism kills the myth of privity. Put in the
context of plural narratives, the private character of contractual relations that
8
9
was born in the nineteenth century and had its revival in the 1980s turns out to
be a liberal stricture. Pluralism reveals the public dimension of contract.
Already the liberal picture of freedom of contract included one public
dimension: state regulation of contract law. The nation-state set up and
enforced public rules designed to back up private normativity and its

5. JEREMY RIFKIN, THE AGE OF ACCESS (2000).
6. GUNTHER TEUBNER, NETWORKS AS CONNECTED CONTRACTS (Hugh Collins ed. & Michelle
Everson trans., 2011).
7. Morris R. Cohen, The Basis of Contract, 46 HARV. L. REV. 553 (1933).
8. PETER S. ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 217–568 (1979).
9. Following the publication of CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE (1981).
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consequences. This simple public guarantee of contractual freedom gets lost in
a globalized world. The global economy knows plural publics.
As the background of contract supplied by the nation-state often is no
longer self-evident, the door for contract theory to reflect on the public
dimension of contract has never been more open. Only a very naïve account of
liberal theory would frame contract as detached from its institutional
environment. True, contract is a vehicle for individual self-determination. Yet
this self-determination unfolds in the sphere of action. According to Kant, law
refers to the “external and practical relation of one Person to another, in so far
as they can have influence upon each other, immediately or mediately, by their
10
Actions as facts.” If law is then about the reality of freedom, legal analysis, as a
result, must be concerned with the conditions of autonomous action.
For early liberal thought, therefore, the relation between law and the
economic system was a central question. Adam Smith was the first to emphasize
the interdependence of a system of justice and an economic system based on a
legal order that provides for and guarantees the constituent economic liberties
11
as individual rights. In his account, the public interest arises from the
12
interaction of “natural liberties,” of rules of conduct, and of market forces.
The genius of a sustainable liberal concept of law was the understanding that
individual freedom was indirectly related to the common good through the
social institution of the market. However, without this nexus of individual rights
and the common good, society would not have tolerated an autonomy-based
conception of contract. An explanation of the binding effect of contract in
purely moral terms is a nice intellectual undertaking, but if this account did not
reflect the institutional structure of society it would be meaningless as a
contribution to legal reasoning. This is not to suggest that a teleological
rationale is the only possible conception of contract. But it should encourage
the various theoretical approaches to explain their respective visions of the
relation between the legal institution of contract and those social institutions
and collective values that make up the context of the very autonomy the law is
meant to protect.
The public dimension of contract can remain unexplored as long as contract
is situated in the context of the nation-state. Under these circumstances, theory
could afford to reason with its eyes shut to the consequences of privity of
contract because it would know that the basic structure of society in which
13
contracts operated was justifiable. However, in a world where contracts get
10. IMMANUEL KANT, Metaphysics of Morals, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW: AN EXPOSITION OF
FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF JURISPRUDENCE AS THE SCIENCE OF RIGHT (W. Hastie trans.,
1887) (1798).
11. ERNST-JOACHIM MESTMÄCKER, A LEGAL THEORY WITHOUT LAW 16–17 (2007).
12. 2 ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS
687 (R.H. Campbell & A.S. Skinner eds., 1981) (1776).
13. For the idea of a division of responsibility between private law institutions and public law
requiring that particular transactions be assessed on their own terms and not be subjected to claims of
distributive justice, see JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 267–68 (1993).
THE
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disembedded from background justice, contract theory is forced to answer how
contract is compatible with the requirements of its social context. Even a
seemingly self-sufficient autonomy-based account must explain how contract
achieves social stability. As has been rightly pointed out, even a liberal
justification has occasion to show that contract must “express norms of freedom
and equality that, even if specific to contract and distinct from those underlying
14
distributive justice, are fully consonant with the latter.”
Given this indispensible public dimension, contract theory always is a
political endeavor. The articles in this symposium outline the landscape of
contemporary foundations of contract and highlight the role of the public in
each conception. Liberal, egalitarian, economic, systemic, deliberative, and
critical approaches present different faces of a public dimension of contract.
Different contract theories imply distinct ideas about contractual pluralism as
well. The different conceptions of contract pluralism presented in this issue
range from those that factually describe the heterogeneous interests of the
parties or the diversity of legal orders to those focused on the conflicts of ethical
values and the collisions of social systems.
The first two contributions to this issue offer a possible metaconceptual
framing for contractual pluralism. Both take normative value pluralism
seriously and try to establish a theoretical structure for a plurality of contract
principles. Revealing the public dimension in promissory and conventional
contract theories, Bertram Lomfeld offers a genuine deliberative solution to the
15
demand of normative pluralism. He frames a comprehensive pluralistic
account of “contract as deliberation” from the perspective of discourse theory.
The basis of contract has many ethical roots, which in the context of contract
law appear as different principles of interpretation. A coherent pluralistic
theory has to reshape monistic principles as relative reasons within a
deliberative second-order framework. Such a deliberative theory of law displays
every social conflict as a collision between different normative reasons. The
decision of the legislator in favor of a particular rule or the decision of the judge
in a particular case constitutes a political balancing act between colliding
reasons. Contracts become deliberative institutions. Parties to a particular
contract promise each other reasons, the weighing of which they can enforce
through law. With such a deliberative contract theory the conflict between
promissory and conventional theories blurs. A contract is a “promise of
reasons” that can be cashed in a conventional legal framework. Every contract
then has a public dimension referring to the public giving and receiving of
reasons. Every contract is a genuine social contract.
Likewise dismissing monistic normative accounts, Hanoch Dagan presents a
structurally pluralist theory of contract in which contract law is an umbrella of a

14. Peter Benson, Contract, in A COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 29,
62 (D. Patterson ed., 2010).
15. Bertram Lomfeld, Contract As Deliberation, 76 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 2, 2013 at 1.
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diverse set of contract institutions, where each institution responds to a
16
different regulative principle. Nonetheless, his structurally pluralist account is
an explicitly autonomy-based contract theory. Therefore, he revisits Joseph
Raz’s account of the relationship between contract law and voluntary
obligations. He relies on Raz’s starting proposition that the entering of
voluntary obligations has a genuine social value and that the role of contract
law should be to protect this practice. Yet he refutes Raz’s further propositions
about the supportive role of contract law and how contract law in its entirety
should be guided by the one regulative principle of autonomy. Instead he
argues with Raz against Raz, relying on Raz’s own account of autonomy as selfauthorship that imposes on the state important responsibilities in supporting
pluralism. For Dagan, an autonomy-based contract law should offer an
umbrella for diverse contract institutions. The main task of an autonomy-based
contract theory is to distill its distinct regulative principles, to elucidate their
contributions to human flourishing, and to offer reform if needed.
The next set of contributions focuses on distinct normative contract
principles. Here, contractual pluralism denotes the evident phenomenon of
plural interests pursued through contractual relations. Although the theoretical
approaches in this section tend to be monistic in the sense that one particular
value structurally trumps others, the mere existence of alternative monistic
reconstructions of the legal order that can all claim to be equally plausible
unintentionally confirms the relevance of the fact of social pluralism for legal
theory.
In his remarks on liberal contract theory, Thomas Gutmann views the
modern concept of contracts as inextricably linked to individual rights
17
protecting the autonomy of persons. Building on a deontic understanding of
rights as legally respected choices, he casts contracts as tools for the free will to
enter into normatively binding agreements by transferring one’s rights to
another person. Private law should focus on the internal relationship of mutual
recognition between the parties and check if the free will in question is
compromised. It must respect the normativity of contract that is constituted by
the equal autonomy of persons. Any instrumentalization of contracts for
collective ends infringes upon this normativity; contracts must remain
unrestrained by duties of social justice. As a consequence of the broad
recognition of the principle of private autonomy in Western legal systems, a
liberal theory of contract can methodologically afford to pursue a “happy
positivism.” It criticizes alternative theories for the source they try to derive
their normativity from. While some theories are rejected for an alleged total
lack of normative reasoning (namely, sociological jurisprudence and critical
legal studies), others are deemed to suffer from a pre-modern fixation on duties
16. Hanoch Dagan, Autonomy, Pluralism, and Contract Law Theory, 76 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS., no. 2, 2013 at 19.
17. Thomas Gutmann, Some Preliminary Remarks on a Liberal Theory of Contract, 76 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 2, 2013 at 39.
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(neo-Aristotelian approaches), consequentionalist thinking (economic analysis),
or inconsistency with private autonomy (social justice approach). Since no other
reason for contractual normativity than self-determination of the individual is
admitted, Gutmann contends that there is no choice of paradigm for the theory
of contract but that any alternative approach must be parasitic upon the liberal
one.
For Florian Rödl, contract law is the expression of a coherent moral
18
structure reflecting the idea of human equality. His argument is based on a
hermeneutic reconstruction of the basic structure of contract law. Neither a
procedural nor an instrumental conception of freedom of contract would be
able to explain the existence of fairness-based legal norms whose purpose is to
fill contractual gaps or to scrutinize contracts for unfair terms. Rather, he
submits, the only way to give a coherent account of the stock of fundamental
private law rules is to assume that contractual freedom must be exercised in line
with contractual justice; unfair contracts cannot be claimed valid by appealing
to contractual freedom. This holds true not just for auxiliary terms but also with
respect to price. Courts determine a test of fair price (justum pretium) with the
help of general clauses that incorporate common usage and trade practice. To
the extent that competition ensures equal distribution of bargaining power, the
law can refer to the results of countless deliberations among parties to a
transaction about the fair price of a commodity. This background is also a
source of the critical potential of Rödl’s approach because it prompts the law to
identify those conditions that are likely to inhibit the conclusion of just
agreements, such as, for example, structural market failures.
In the eyes of Hugh Collins, the expansion of constitutional and humanrights control of private law indicates the end of private autonomy as limited to
19
negative freedom from interference. Once the legal framework is understood
in terms of competing rights, legal analysis is forced to consider the real choices
available to both parties. In particular, there can then be no remaining scope for
an unregulated private sphere of freedom to choose a contractual partner.
Whereas English common law acknowledged only a few exceptions to this
principle, Collins argues that anti-discrimination laws on the European and
national level challenge the liberal distinction between a (regulated) public and
a (unregulated) private sphere in which individuals are said to enjoy unfettered
choice. Given the willingness of constitutional courts to apply antidiscrimination rules in the context of private transactions and the family (as is
apparent in the scrutiny of a will by the European Court of Human Rights in
20
Pla and Puncernau v. Andorra ), Collins concludes that a completely insulated
private sphere can no longer exist. If law is meant to promote the positive

18. Florian Rödl, Contractual Freedom, Contractual Justice, and Contract Law (Theory), 76 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 2, 2013 at 57.
19. Hugh Collins, The Vanishing Freedom to Choose a Contractual Partner, 76 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS., no. 2, 2013 at 71.
20. App. No. 69498/01, 2004-VIII Eur. Ct. H.R. 334.
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freedom of all members of a society, the boundaries to the protection of this
sphere must be set by the competing rights of others, the relative importance of
which are measured by reference to a test of proportionality. Public interest
enters private law by the insertion of human rights.
Lorenz Kähler discusses the emergence of “contract management” to
21
enhance the efficiency of contracts. IT-based internal monitoring manages the
contractual lifecycle from the conclusion of the contract to any eventual
litigation. In order to govern and keep track of a growing number of contracts,
business corporations increasingly make use of this tool of analysis. Understood
as a reaction to their sheer number, as well as the length and vagueness of many
business contracts, contract management adds another level of standardization
to mass contracting that goes beyond the use of boilerplate. Although in
principle a voluntary measure to promote efficiency, contract management
provides the legislator (and potentially private standard-setters) with an
innovative opportunity for “secondary” contract regulation that does not come
in at the point of performance of duties between the parties, but instead
considers how one party deals with all of its existing contracts. For instance, the
22
European Gender Directive requires equal treatment of all contracting parties.
A form of secondary control is also introduced by the risk-management rules of
the finance industry, with mechanisms to prevent the contractual risk from
spreading to third parties. As such, contract-management duties limit
contractual freedom. At the same time, however, they might prospectively
replace regulations of primary contractual obligations and thus ultimately
broaden contractual freedom.
Whereas this second set of theories locates the public dimension of contract
mainly in contract law, viewing contractual pluralism as an indicator for the
plurality of interests within the frame of a respective public legal policy, critical
legal theory denounces exactly this political power to determine the
conceptions and realities of contract as a means of social oppression. Along
these lines Alessandro Somma criticizes the politics of private law using the
23
example of the European Project of a Common Contract Law. The distinction
between private and public law constitutes an artificial boundary that was only
introduced through the bourgeois order of property and the subsequent class
stratification in capitalist society. The ordoliberal way of social market
economies, which are located between liberal and socialist orders, does not lead
to any real kind of emancipation. While this “order of liberation” does not
destroy its subjects, it establishes a “biopolitical” power that enforces a
particular way of life. Thereby every ordoliberal “biopolitics” intends to reduce

21. Lorenz Kähler, Contract-Management Duties as a New Regulatory Device, 76 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 2, 2013 at 89.
22. Council Directive 2004/113/EC of December 13, 2004, implementing the principle of equal
treatment between men and women in the access to and supply of goods and services.
23. Alessandro Somma, Private Law as Biopolitics: Ordoliberalism, Social Market Economy, and
the Public Dimension of Contract, 76 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 2, 2013 at 105.
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social pluralism. Private law, too, exercises such ordering police functions. The
project for a Common European Contract Law then appears as an ordoliberal
move to reduce the contractual pluralism within Europe and to enforce a
unitizing European biopolitics.
The example of European contract law leads to another genuine contractual
pluralism that is associated with the globalization of law. Here, the public
dimension transcends the public policy of one domestic contract law.
Transnational contracts listen to multiple legal backgrounds and contract laws.
Within that legal pluralism transnational contracts create or form their own
legal orders. Not only the legal framework, but the global public is more
diversified, too. Already within a nation-state, a unified political public is a
contrafactual myth. At any rate, a transnational public dimension demands an
even more pluralistic theoretical setting of contract. Transnational contractual
pluralism denotes plural legal orders and plural publics.
Peer Zumbansen enfolds the idea of contract from the perspective of
24
transnational private governance. Within the current global shift “from
government to governance,” contract celebrates its comeback as the central
social institution. Contractual governance is the dominant ordering paradigm
for the lex mercatoria or law merchant, which is the main self-regulating legal
regime of transnational private interactions. But transnational accounts have
mostly oversimplified, stripped-down, mechanical concepts of contracting. Its
reductionist models emphasize governing contracts as key instruments of
private ordering relations, thereby ignoring the historically evolved, complex
“embeddedness” of contract. A bridging perspective might attempt to scrutinize
a direct “public” dimension of transnational private ordering by analyzing, for
example, compulsory standards in international commercial arbitration. Yet a
more profound theory of transnational contracts has to find its own
methodological answer to contractual governance. A transnational-contracttheory approach scrutinizes the nature of the law–non-law as much as the
private–public distinction. Transnational contract theory prompts us to study
the emergence of hybrid, unruly, and messy regulatory regimes as instantiations
of an evolving legal rationality in the context of world society.
In a globalized world, states are no longer the stable reference point for a
public backing of contractual relations. Yet in a paradoxical erosion of
legitimacy described by Andreas Abegg, the state as central authority has itself
25
become more and more dependent on collaboration with private persons.
Private contracts concerning administrative action and social benefits, private
public partnerships, and contractual assignment of public functions constitute
increasingly important instruments of public action. The contractual structure
leads to a juxtaposition of law and those subsystems of society that are
24. Peer Zumbansen, Transnational Private Regulatory Governance: Ambiguities of Public
Authority and Private Power, 76 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 2, 2013 at 117.
25. Andreas Abegg, The Legitimacy of the Contracting State, 76 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 2,
2013 at 139.
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contractually linked with the political system. This intervention by cooperation
requires limited freedom to negotiate the means and, ultimately, the ends of
administrative action and thereby fundamentally calls into question the
principle of strict “legality of the administration.” In search of new modes of
legitimacy recognizing the polycontexturality of modern society, Abegg rejects
rule-of-law legitimacy mechanisms that would extend administrative law and
enforcement principles to state contracting. The genuinely state-centered
perspective still adheres to the idea of one great “Social Contract,” which is
today broken up into multiple smaller contracts between the political and other
functional systems in a fragmented society. Habermasian democratic
legitimacy—developed with regard to the constitutional state—allows for a
supplement of legislation by “justification discourses” arising from the inner
democratization and participation of affected parties. However, as Abegg
argues, only a proceduralist perspective adopted by an evolutionary-reflexive
theory can truly avoid the dangers of political bias. In a procedure involving the
legal system and its courts, legal academia, and the systems affected, a specific
kind of “social legislation” is developed to foster each system’s sensitiveness to
the requirements of its environment. Drawing on Swiss case law, general clauses
seem an appropriate instrument to be turned into reflexive “regime collision
rules.”
A third level of contractual pluralism leaves behind the idea of subjective
understanding as the premise for social action and focuses on plural social
environments and systems. For Pasquale Femia, the public dimension of
26
contract lies in the common textuality. Within his deconstructive method of
law the textuality of a contract diminishes the importance of the will of the
parties as a source of contractual normativity. The language of consensus
conceals that every individual contract constitutes a highly specialized system
for generating and transferring private power. Through writing, incidences of
complex social interaction are broken down into distinct actions. Social dissent
disappears in the dark of a discourse based on professional jargon. This
pathological selectivity of contracts leads to a “paranomic” situation, an
epistemic breakage in which normative discourse conceals its actual effects. The
public dimension of contract thus consists in the difference between text as an
independent modality of norms and shifts in real power relations. The critical
counter-strategy of a deconstructive theory thus attempts to publicly visualize
the power-divisional strategy of contracts through small but incessant ruptures.
In particular, the application of fundamental rights in private law is able to open
up the paranomic language of contracts and to draw attention to the political
dimension of contracts.
From a system-theoretical perspective, Marc Amstutz is particularly
interested in the relationship between contract law and the evolution of social

26. Pasquale Femia, Desire for Text: Bridling the Divisional Strategy of Contract, 76 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 2, 2013 at 151.
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structures. As a social fact, every contract is embedded in a context of different
function systems, in which subsystems develop in order to fulfill the purpose of
the contract. For the provision of complex services, several contracts may be
connected with each other in networks. Through this network, an emerging
order of expectations develops that imposes itself on the discourses initiated by
the conclusion of the individual contracts. A strictly bipolar contract law is not
able to capture the specific mode of operation of networks and is unable to
decide which of the discourses involved may cause a malfunction of the
network. Appropriate legal rules for networks can only be achieved when one
transfers the method for determining the applicable law in cases of a conflict of
laws to the plurality of contractual normativities in a network. To the extent
that one determines the law applicable to a particular legal relationship
according to the social function of that relationship, network conflicts should be
solved in accordance with that particular contract that ensures the functionality
of the entire network.
Also fertilizing systems theory for the purpose of legal analysis, Dan
Wielsch finally reconnects to the contractual meta-pluralism of the first
28
contributions. He concentrates on the relationship between rights and their
social environment. The legal institution of contract helps to stabilize emergent
social systems of interaction, which extend the spheres of freedom of the parties
involved. However, the will of the parties constitutes only one of several
autonomies in whose reference a particular contract is situated. A concept of
“relational justice” thus obliges the court to consider all relevant social
references of contractual rights. Only this explication of the public dimension of
contract makes it possible to judge the appropriateness of a legal rule for each
individual conflict. Conversely, the recognition of privately created norms as
law presupposes that the process of norm generation has taken account of
diverse social perspectives. This is particularly important when the content of
contracts is formed by standard terms exempt from individual disposition. Since
this way of contracting is prone to neglect environmental reference, fairness
tests are needed as public rules of recognition for this form of private
regulation. In any case, considering the social multi-referentiality of rights is a
central criterion for legitimacy of state law and private law alike. The concept of
relational justice tries to contribute to legal theory’s task of determining the
substantial requirements of lawmaking under conditions of normative
pluralism.
Is there a common lesson to be gleaned from these different approaches?
Could these theories ever enter into a productive dialogue? From a pluralistic
standpoint it is important to acknowledge that the pluralism of contract theories
itself has a public or political dimension. Some reflections on contract theory
offer criteria to evaluate contract theories in terms of “fit,” “coherence,”
27. Marc Amstutz, Contract Collisions: An Evolutionary Perspective on Contractual Networks, 76
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 2, 2013 at 169.
28. Dan Wielsch, Relational Justice, 76 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 2, 2013 at 169.
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“morality,” or “transparency.” But the reference to common standards of
contract theory is too simple and is itself rooted in one particular idea about the
relation between contract and law. This sketch of the theoretical landscape of
the public dimension of contract attempts to domesticate, confine, and open the
terms “contract” and “public,” and thereby contribute to the necessary
reordering of the fragile public–private distinction in general.
The overview in this issue reveals the political dimension of theoretical
conceptions of contract. Of course this is not an exclusive phenomenon of
contract theory. All basic institutions of private law at the same time constitute
the social framework of our everyday life and are constituted of and influenced
by diverse theoretical backgrounds. To reveal this often overlooked societal
dimension of private law is the essential ambition of the private law theory
30
(PLT) project. Dismissing old and rigid categorizations, PLT piece by piece
enfolds a genuine public dimension of private law altogether.
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be found online at http://privatelawtheory.net.

